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ABSTRACT
The view that U.S. businesses are being unfairly hurt by barriers to access in foreign markets
has raised demands for market access requirements (MARS) from within U.S. industry and
government alike. We show that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom of the recent literature, MARS
can be implemented in a procompetitive manner. The basic idea is that the requirement must be
implemented in a way that provides the right incentives for increasing aggregate output or lowering
prices. We provide two examples to illustrate this point. In the context of a Cournot duopoly, we
show that an implementation scheme in which the U.S. firm receives a preannounced subsidy if the
market share target is met leads to increased aggregate output. In a second example, we show that
a MAR on an imported intermediate input can lead not only to increased imports of the intermediate
good, but also to increased output in the final good market using the input. The intuition is that
increasing output of the final good helps to make the MAR less binding and this reduces the
marginal cost of production in the final good market. Thus our results buttress the point made in
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The view that U.S. businesses are being unfairly hurt by barriers to access in foreign mar-
kets has raised demands for market access requirements (MARS) from within U.S. industry
and government’ alike. For example, in the 1980’s,  U.S. semiconductor firms successfully
lobbied for MARS to increase U.S. market share for semiconductors in Japan. In July 1993,
the Clinton administration provided further endorsement of this view with the Framework
Agreement to initiate negotiations for market opening measures in Japan across four broad
sectors-automobiles and auto parts, medical equipment, telecommunications and insurance.
Thus MARS are fast becoming a staple in the U.S. government’s arsenal of trade policy
instruments. However, despite the growing importance of MARS, not much attention has
been paid to how they are implemented. Clearly, failure to understand the mechanisms
used to attain market access represents a serious knowledge gap that precludes sound policy
decision making.
Previous theoretical analyses - Irwin (1994)) Greaney (1996a) and Krishna, Roy and
Thursby (1997)) among others - have suggested that MARS unambiguously reduce competi-
tion and raise prices. An exception to this conclusion is found in Krishna and Morgan (1996)
showing that there exist conditions under which competition is increased when a MAR on
a specific market is implemented by threats on a related market. This raises the important
question: under what circumstances can a MAR be procompetitive?
This paper suggests that there may be a variety of situations under which a MAR is
procompetitive. Specifically, we provide two very different examples illustrating this point.
The first example is framed within an imperfectly competitive setting and employs the same
timing assumption used by Greaney (1996a) to show the anticompetitive nature of MARs.
The main idea is that when the instrument is targeted at the right set of firms, the market
1access requirement can be procompetitive. The second example explores the effects of a
MAR imposed on an intermediate input.’ Thus this example picks up the suggestion of
Krishna and Morgan (1996) that in order to properly evaluate the effects of a market access
requirement, it is important to consider not only the market subjected to the MAR but
also markets that are related. This assumes even greater importance given that some of
the major industries targeted for market access requirements involve intermediate goods like
semiconductors and auto parts.
We first consider a simple Cournot duopoly and examine an implementation scheme
under which the Japanese government moves first and announces a fixed amount subsidy
t’o be given to the U.S. firm only in the event that the market share target is satisfied. We
show that in this situation the MAR is procompetitive. The intuition is that the U.S. firm
has an incentive to expand production in order to avail of the subsidy while the promise of
a subsidy to the U.S. firm leaves the Japanese firm’s strategic behavior unchanged. Since
the decision variables are strategic substitutes, the expansion in U.S. output leads to a
reduction of Japanese output. However, under general demand conditions and constant
marginal costs, the increase in U.S. output more than outweighs the decrease in Japanese
output so that, in equilibrium, aggregate output increases and price falls. Next we examine
an example in which market access requirements in a market may have unexpected effects
on related markets. Specifically, we show that requirements placed on the purchases of
intermediate goods result in procompetitive effects in the final good market. The intuition
is that by expanding production, the final good producer makes its constraint less binding.
Our results buttress the point made in Krishna, Roy and Thursby (1997) that the effects of
a MAR depend crucially on the way that it is administered.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a quick
1 See Qiu and Spencer  (1997) for the implications  of VIES and VER.s in the context  of keiretsu.
2review of the policy debate surrounding market access and the related literature. Section
3 sets up the simple duopoly model and analyzes the fixed amount subsidy scheme while
Section 4 looks at the effect of a MAR on related markets. The last section offers concluding
comments.
2. Policy Debate: Review and Analysis
The growing concern over the lack of access for U.S. firms to foreign markets perceived
as being unfairly ‘closed’ has fostered the evolution of a new trade policy instrument - the
market access requirement (MAR) otherwise known as the voluntary import expansion (VIE)
- that has subsequently been endorsed by the Clinton administration.2 A MAR seeks to
increase market access in the following manner: if a specific foreign market is deemed ‘closed’
to U.S. firms, the U.S. government enters into trade negotiations with the foreign government
and extracts from it some guarantee of a minimum share of that market for U.S. firms. The
burden of enforcing t.he market access requirement, though, is usually left to the foreign
government. As pointed out in Irwin (1994, pg. 63), ‘...the United States never seems
concerned about the mechanism by which “voluntary” bilateral agreements are carried out
and acts as if the foreign government can solve the problem by fiat. ’ In the case of the
U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade dispute, Irwin (1996) documents  how the Semiconductor
Industry Association’s section 301 petition and Micron’s antidumping suit helped to pressure
Japan into signing the Semiconductor Trade Agreement of 1986 stipulat,ing  that U.S. firms
achieve a 20% share of the Japanese chip market by 1992. However, having signed the
agreement the task of enforcement was left to the Japanese government. Irwin (1996, pg.
51) observes, ‘Implementation - quite mistakenly - was not viewed as a major concern for
U.S. negotiators, but it was a real problem for Japan precisely because it was now committed
2 The terms ‘MAR’ and ‘VIE’ are used interchangeably  throughout  the rest of the text.
3to certain action in a governmental agreement and under threat of sanction if the terms of
the agreement were violated.’
While market access requirements have been modeled in several different ways in the liter-
ature, the general conclusion has been that these requirements reduce competition. Krishna,
Roy and Thursby (1997) h s ow that if the level of the instrument used by the government
to enforce the MAR can be manipulated by the firms, the result is higher prices. Specifi-
cally, subsidy levels chosen by the home government to meet the market share target after
duopolistic firms have picked prices (but before the market clears) create powerful incentives
for both firms to raise prices in the targeted market. The intuition is that the U.S. firm has
an incentive to trigger a subsidy for itself by raising price and lowering its sales such that
the market share target is violated. On the other hand, the Japanese firm is strategically
motivated to increase its price in order to reduce its market share and prevent the subsidy
being conferred on the U.S. product.
Even when the firms cannot strategically affect the level of the instrument, t,he MAR
can be anticompetitive. This is shown in the duopoly model of Greaney (1996a) where the
Japanese government moves first and threatens its domestic firm with a fixed harsh financial
penalty in the event that the market share target is not met. In this case, the Japanese firm
has a strategic incentive to raise price in order to lower its sales and prevent the penalty
from being triggered. The strategic behavior of the U.S. firm is not aflected by the penalty
threat since the threat is enforced only after the market clears and profits have been earned.
However, since the firms are competing in strategic complements, the U.S. firm matches its
rival’s price increases and, in equilibrium, both prices are higher compared to free trade. We
use the same timing structure as Greaney (1996a) and show that appropriate incentives can
make a market access requirement procompetitive.
4More recent work has continued to demonstrate the undesirability of market access re-
quirements. Greaney (1996b) considers the case where differences in a U.S. firm’s share of
the market in a third country relative to the Japanese market in the current period affect,s
both the probability with which the U.S. firm can successfully lobby for a VIE as well as the
level of the VIE to be imposed on the Japanese market in the next period. If the petition
is successful then enforcement takes the form of the financial penalty threat used in Gre-
aney (1996a). In this framework, she demonstrates that the prospect of a VIE strategically
affects both firms first period production decisions and can reduce the li.S. firm’s average
market share in the foreign market over the two periods - contrary to the prediction of VIE
proponents.
Dumler (1996) examines using the threat of an administrative relief measure (ARM),
e.g., an antidumping duty, as a means of implementing a VIE. Employing an intraindustry
trade model as in Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983),  he considers the case
where, similar to Greaney (1996b),  the domestic and foreign firm’s first period market shares
affect the probability that the domestic firm’s petition for administrative relief will receive
a favorable review. However, unlike Greaney (1996b), successful petitioning results in a
reinstatement of the antidumping duty that had been suspended in return for the foreign
government’s acceptance of a market share VIE before the beginning of the game. Dumler
shows that a VIE implemented with an ARM generally reduces overall trade volumes and
increases prices.
In contrast, Krishna and Morgan (1996) considers the case of the U.S. - Japan auto
parts trade dispute and shows that a MAR on the Japanese auto parts market can be
implemented by a threat of punitive sanctions on Japanese auto exports to the U.S. market
in a procompetitive manner. In like vein, this paper provides two other scenarios under
5which a MAR lowers prices. The next two sections discuss this in greater detail. Similar to
Krishna and Morgan (1996), we present essentially a graphical treatment of the analysis.
3, Example with Imperfect Competition
3.1 Model
We consider a two-stage game played by the Japanese firm (firm l), the U.S. firm (firm 2)
and the Japanese government. In the first stage, the government credibly commits to a fixed
amount subsidy S to be given to the U.S. firm only if the U.S. share of the market is larger
than the pre-negot iated minimum. The Japanese and the U.S. firm, then, simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choose outputs z and y, respectively, in the second stage after which
the market clears. The government then observes the outputs and enforces its promise of a
subsidy only if the market share target is met. We focus on subgame  perfect equilibria.
Let P(X) be the twice continuously differentiable inverse demand function, downward
sloping, P’(.) < 0, and strictly concave, P”(.) < 0, whenever positive. Let’ P(.) be positive
on some interval [0,x] , for some x > 0. Assume that each firm has a constant marginal
cost of production c. Let the market share target be Q, i.e., the constraint is satisfied only if
-& > a, where LL:  E (0,l).
3.2 U.S. firm’s best response
Consider the U.S. firm’s (firm 2’s) optimal choice. Its ordinary Cournot profit is
(1)
while its profit with the subsidy is
Q(.) = %(.) + s (2)
6For any Japanese output 2, let gz(.) be the minimum output that the US. firm must
produce in order to meet the market share constraint, i.e., gz(.) = (e) x. Clearly, firm 2
receives the subsidy for outputs greater than g2(.) but earns its ordinary profit for smaller
outputs. Thus, its overall profit function is given by
(3) ji2(.) = T2(.) for 92 < 92(.)
772(.> for y2 2 92(.)
Let Bz(.) and zz(.) denote the unique maximizers of ordinary profit and subsidy-ridden
profit, respectively. Further, let &(.) be the maximizer of overall profit. Then, depending
on its rival’s output, firm 2’s profit function must belong in one of the three possible regimes
depicted in Figs. l(a)-l(c).
First, note that ordinary profit is concave, and, that the subsidy profit curve is simply the
ordinary profit shifted up vertically by the amount of the subsidy. Since the amount of the
subsidy is fixed, the output that maximizes ordinary profit also maximizes subsidy profit,
i.e., B2(.) = ??z(.). The overall profit function is shown by the bold curve in all the three
figures. In the first case, firm 2’s ordinary (and subsidy) profit maximizer is greater than
the minimum output required to meet the constraint and, clearly, it is best off producing
along its Cournot best response, i.e., &(.) = &(.). In the second case, g2( .) > B2( .) and
firm 2’s best response is to produce the minimum required to meet the market share target,
i.e., &(.) = g2(.). Finally, we may have the situation depicted in Fig. l(c) where firm 2 is
better off ignoring the promise of the subsidy and producing its ordinary Cournot output,
i.e., B2(.) = &(.).
The U.S. firm’s best response is illustrated in Fig. 2. Br and B2 are the Japanese and
U.S. Cournot best responses, respectively, while OM represents the market share constraint
line. Since the constraint is assumed to be binding under free trade it lies to the left of
7the free trade point F. The U.S. firm’s overall best response is depicted by the bold curve.
For small Japanese outputs, the best response lies along the Cournot best response until
the point H where B2 intersects OM. As Japanese output increases beyond this level, firm
2 switches to producing along the market share line. This occurs until point I is reached,
whereupon, firm 2’s overall best response jumps down to point J on its ordinary Cournot
best response. It should be pointed out that when x = J1 firm 2 is indifferent between points
I and J.3 Further, it can be shown that this jump point is increasing in S.
3.3 Equilibrium
Note that the Japanese firm is unaffected by the subsidy and its strategic behavior remains
unchanged. This is a consequence of the timing of moves that we have used - the same timing
employed in Greaney (1996a). Specifically, the subsidy, when granted, is paid out only after
the firms have put their outputs on the market and sales have been made. Given this timing,
since only the U.S. firm is offered the subsidy, it does not enter into the Japanese firm’s profit
function and, hence, leaves its best response unaltered. Identifying the equilibrium is simply
a matter of finding the point where the U.S. firm’s overall best response intersects the
Japanese firm’s ordinary Cournot best response, i.e., point E in Fig. 2. However, a different
timing structure could very well impact on the Japanese firm’s best response too and result
in a different equilibrium. This, for instance, occurs with the timing employed in Krishna,
Roy and Thursby (1997) discussed in the previous section.
Suppose the government chooses the minimum S which supports a pure st’rategy  Nash
equilibrium satisfying the market share target. This would be that S for which the jump
point J1 coincides with Er and results in an equilibrium at point E, i.e., the U.S. firm’s best
response jumps down from point E to point G at zr = Er and coincides with its Cournot
3 It can be mathematically shown that this jump point  exists  and is unique.
8best response for larger 2. However, any S greater than this critical level will also result
in this equilibrium. Note that the locus of points with aggregate output equal to that
under free trade is given by the line with slope -1 drawn through F in Fig. 2. Given our
assumptions, the Japanese firm’s Cournot best response Br is steeper than this line. Hence,
the equilibrium at E represents a larger aggregate output and lower price compared to the
free trade equilibrium at F.I* This result is robust to the type of competition, i.e., the fixed
amount subsidy can be shown to also lower prices of both goods under Bertrand competition
in a differentiated products duopoly.
It should be pointed out that, for purposes of expositional ease, Fig. 2 has been drawn
on the assumption that the firms are completely symmetric. Consequently, the free trade
point F lies on the 45 degree diagonal. Introducing asymmetries into the picture would
not change the basic result as long as the slope of the best responses are between -1 and
0 (guaranteed by our assumptions on demand and cost). For instance, we could have the
case where the Japanese ordinary best response has a much larger vertical intercept than
the U.S. best response. This would yield a free trade U.S. market share smaller than 50
percent and the point of intersection of the Cournot best responses would occur to the right
of the 45 degree line. However, again, as long as the market share constraint is binding
under bee trade, the same argument can be used to show that the equilibrium (occurring at
the intersection of the market share line and the Japanese best response) is procompetitive.
The natural question that arises now is what would happen if the subsidy were to be given
to the Japanese firm only? Using similar analysis, it can be shown that a subsidy offered to
the Japanese firm only would be anticompetitive. In this case, the U.S. firm’s best response
would remain unaffected by the subsidy. The Japanese best response would lie along its
4 Note that the free trade equilibrium  F is also a candidate  equilibrium  but it does  not satisfy the market
access requirement.
9ordinary Cournot best response for small values of y up to some critical point at which it
would jump down to the market share line OM. For larger U.S. outputs, the Japanese best
response would switch back to its Cournot best response. Hence, the equilibrium would be
at point H (in Fig. 2) which yields a higher price than F. Here, the promise of the subsidy
provides an incentive for the Japanese firm to cut back on output. This, in turn, is associated
with a less than proportional increase in the U.S. firm’s output such that, aggregate output
falls and price rises.
4. Example with Interrelated Markets
A surprising consequence of implementing firm specific import targets is sketched below.
Suppose that targets for imports are set on the Japanese firms using the imported U.S. good
as input in production. Then, the effect of the import requirement can be shown to result. in
a reduction in each importing firm’s marginal cost of production for given input prices, The
intuition is straightforward: increasing output helps to make the market access requirement
less binding and this reduces the marginal cost of production. Thus, this scheme would not
only raise exports of the U.S. intermediate input, it would also impact the final product
market since lower marginal costs of production tend to increase the supply of a firm in
most models of perfect and imperfect competition.
4.1 Model
Let us consider the simplest possible model where a representative Japanese firm, say firm
1, uses two inputs (one U.S. input and one Japanese input) to produce a final good. Let x
and y denote the amounts of the Japanese input and the U.S. input, respectively, purchased
by firm 1. Now, suppose the Japanese government imposes firm-specific requirements on
the U.S. input purchases of firm 1. Specifically, assume that the value of firm l’s U.S. input
10purchases must exceed a pre-specified minimum T.5 Let T and w denote the prices of the
Japanese and U.S. input, respectively,which are taken as given by firm 1, and let Q represent
firm l’s output of the final good. How does this market access requirement affect the final
good producer?
4.2 Final good producer’s optimization problem
Let C(r, w, Q) be firm l’s ordinary cost function and let F(x, y) be its production function.
Now, due to the input purchase requirement, it faces the following problem:
Minimize R = TX + wy subject to wy > T and F(x, y) = Q
or, equivalently,
Maximize R = -rx - wy subject to T - wy 5 0 and F(x, y) = Q
Setting up the Lagrangian and taking the first order conditions, we get















5 Such requirements  can be implemented  through  the threat of prohibitively harsh financial  penalties  for
non-compliance.
11If the constraint is binding (,!.L > 0), from (6) and (7), we get
F, r
F,= w-pw
Notice that the market access requirement acts like a subsidy of ,XLW on the U.S. input
and increases firm l’s cost minimizing Y/X input ratio. This, in turn increases the marginal
product of Japanese input F, and lowers X (= +$ from equation (6)) .6 But, X is simply the
firm’s marginal cost of production! Hence, firm 1 increases its production of the final good
leading to a fall in the price of the output.
5. Conclusion
We show that, contrary to the findings of the recent literature, market access requirements
can be implemented in a procompetitive manner. The basic idea is that the requirement
must be implemented in a way that provides the right incentives for increasing aggregate
output or lowering prices. In the first example, procompetitive effects occur if the right firm
is targeted by a preannounced subsidy. In our second example procompetitive effects occur
because t’he MAR acts like a subsidy on the imported input. Because increased purchases
of the imported input increase the marginal product of the other input, the marginal cost of
production falls, which in most models will lead to an increase in output of the final good.
Thus this paper demonstrates that procompetitive enforcement of MARS must pay attention
to the issues of proper targeting and the effects of related markets.
6 Note that R(T, w, Q, T) is the minimized  value of firm l’s cost. By the envelope  theorem, a%.) - 3LC.l -
aQ aQ
-A(.) and since R(.) = -R(.), we get @ = A(.). Similarly,  we get $$ = ,u(.).
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